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O P I N I O N 
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 This appeal is from the District Court’s order to cancel 
a mortgage loan made by IndyMac Bank, FSB, to Jose and 
Maria Tellado.  After IndyMac failed and was placed into 
receivership, with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) as its receiver, the mortgage loan was purchased from 
the FDIC by OneWest Bank, FSB.  OneWest challenges the 
District Court’s August 8, 2011, order directing OneWest to 
cancel the loan and refund to the Tellados all payments made 
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under the mortgage loan agreement.  OneWest also 
challenges the $10,000 penalty that the District Court levied 
against OneWest for failing to comply with the District 
Court’s order to produce its Chief Executive Officer (CEO) at 
trial.  For the reasons that follow, we will reverse both the 
District Court’s August 8, 2011, order and the penalty order. 
penalty order. 
 I.  FACTS 
 In June 2007, Jose Tellado heard a Spanish-language 
radio advertisement for mortgage refinancing services.  When 
he called the number provided, he reached Carlos Enrique 
and spoke with him exclusively in Spanish to arrange a 
refinancing of their existing mortgage on their home at 519 
Morris Street in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  Enrique helped 
Tellado and his wife, Maria, with the submission of a loan 
application and arranged for a closing agent to visit the 
Tellados’ home.  Philip Bloom, a closing agent and notary 
acting as a representative of IndyMac, conducted the closing 
at the Tellados’ home.  The relevant loan documents which he 
provided to them, including the notice of the right to cancel, 
were in English.  Oral communications between Bloom and 
the Tellados, who speak primarily Spanish, were conducted 
through Marcelina Fuster, the Tellados’ daughter, who served 
as an interpreter.  She translated Bloom’s verbal instructions 
and his explanations of the loan documents.  
  
 The lender on the mortgage was IndyMac, a federally 
chartered savings bank.  IndyMac subsequently failed, and on 
July 11, 2008, it was entered into FDIC receivership.  On 
March 18, 2009, the FDIC transferred the Tellados’ loan, in 
addition to other loans formerly owned by IndyMac, to 
OneWest under a Master Purchase Agreement (MPA).  
Pursuant to the MPA, OneWest assumed only certain 
liabilities. 
 
 On August 5, 2009, the Tellados sent a notice of 
cancellation to IndyMac Mortgage Services, a division of 
OneWest, stating that they sought to cancel the loan pursuant 
to Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer 
Protection Law (UTPCPL), 73 P.S. § 201-7.  In the notice, 
they explained that the basis for their cancellation was that 
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they had received all documents related to the mortgage, 
including the notice of the right to cancel, in English while all 
prior oral discussions relating to the transaction had been 
conducted in Spanish.  They notified OneWest of their intent 
to file suit if they did not receive a response within ten days.  
When OneWest did not respond, the Tellados filed suit in 
Pennsylvania state court on August 24, 2009.1  On October 
27, 2009, they filed an amended complaint seeking a 
determination that the loan was void and that OneWest had 
forfeited the right to any further payment or, in the 
alternative, seeking triple damages based on the amount of 
the payments they had made on the loan or on the amount of 
the security interest retained in their home.  On November 2, 
2009, OneWest removed the case to the District Court.2
 
 
 OneWest then filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6), a motion for summary judgment, and a motion to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The District 
Court denied all of these requests for relief.  On November 3, 
2010, the District Court scheduled the case for a bench trial 
beginning on November 8.  In the scheduling order, the 
District Court also ordered the CEO of OneWest to appear at 
the trial.   
 
 After the bench trial, the District Court ruled in the 
Tellados’ favor.  The court found that the loan transaction, 
from the initial contact through the loan closing, was 
conducted in Spanish.  The court, therefore, held that the 
UTPCPL, 73 P.S. § 201-7, governed the transaction because 
the Tellados had purchased mortgage refinancing services for 
a price in excess of twenty-five dollars.  Under 73 P.S. § 201-
7, the Tellados could cancel the transaction within three days 
of receiving a valid notice of the right to cancel in the same 
                                              
1 The named defendant in the suit was formally IndyMac 
Mortgage Services, the division of OneWest that legally held 
the Tellados’ mortgage. 
 
2 OneWest also responded to the Tellados in a letter dated 
October 15, 2009, denying their request to rescind the 
mortgage, and on November 3, 2009, it sent them a notice of 
its intention to foreclose. 
 
5 
 
language as that principally used in the oral sales 
presentation.  Because IndyMac had not provided notice in 
Spanish, the language of the loan transaction, the District 
Court held that IndyMac had failed to provide proper notice 
and the three-day cancellation period had never begun to run.  
The District Court found that the written cancellation the 
Tellados provided to OneWest on August 9, 2009, was 
effective and binding.  The District Court ordered OneWest to 
refund to the Tellados all payments that had been made on the 
mortgage, terminate its security interest in the Tellados’ 
home, and return any negotiable instrument executed in 
connection with the transaction.  The court also permitted the 
Tellados to keep the principal that had originally been lent to 
them by IndyMac. 
 
 Subsequently, without further notice or hearing, the 
District Court on December 1, 2010, imposed a $10,000 
penalty on OneWest under Rule 16(f)(1)(C) because 
OneWest’s CEO had not appeared at trial as provided for in 
the court’s scheduling order.3
 
   OneWest appealed.  It 
argues that the District Court erred in multiple ways in 
finding for the Tellados after trial and in denying OneWest’s 
motions to dismiss and for summary judgment.  OneWest 
also contends that the District Court erred in imposing a 
$10,000 penalty because OneWest had failed to follow the 
order requiring the presence of its CEO at trial. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
 We have appellate jurisdiction over this appeal of the 
District Court’s final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “On the 
appeal of a bench trial, we review a district court’s findings of 
                                              
3 OneWest filed a Motion to Alter, Amend or Otherwise 
Clarify the December 1, 2010, Order and to Stay Enforcement 
of the Sanction on December 29, 2010.  On June 17, 2011, 
the District Court entered an order stating that the penalty was 
to be borne solely by OneWest and not by its CEO.  It also 
denied OneWest’s request to stay the penalty.  OneWest 
appealed the December 1, 2010, order on June 22, 2011, and 
paid the penalty on June 27, 2011.  OneWest also appealed 
the penalty in its August 18, 2011, appeal of the District 
Court’s August 8, 2011, order. 
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fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.” 
McCutcheon v. America’s Servicing Co., 560 F.3d 143, 147 
(3d Cir. 2009).   
 
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
 
 OneWest argues that the District Court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction over the Tellados’ claim based on the 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement 
Act of 1989 (FIRREA).  Whether subject matter jurisdiction 
exists is “a legal question over which we exercise plenary 
review.” Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. City 
Savings, F.S.B., 28 F.3d 376, 383 (3d Cir. 1994).   
 
FIRREA, which was passed in response to the savings 
and loan crisis of the 1980s, gives the FDIC the authority to 
act as receiver or conservator for failed institutions. Benson v. 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 1207, 1211 (9th Cir. 
2012).  The statute also creates an administrative claims 
process for institutions in receivership and limits judicial 
review of certain claims. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3)-(13).  
Section 1821(d)(13)(D) provides: 
 
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, no 
court shall have jurisdiction over— 
 
(i) any claim or action for payment from, or any action 
seeking a determination of rights with respect to, the 
assets of any depository institution for which the 
[FDIC] has been appointed receiver, including assets 
which the [FDIC] may acquire from itself as such 
receiver; or  
 
(ii) any claim relating to any act or omission of such 
institution or the [FDIC] as receiver. 
 
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D).  We have interpreted section 
1821(d)(13)(D) to be a “statutory exhaustion requirement:  in 
order to obtain jurisdiction to bring a claim in federal court, 
one must exhaust administrative remedies by submitting the 
claim to the receiver in accordance with the administrative 
scheme for adjudicating claims detailed in § 1821(d).” Nat. 
Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 28 F.3d at 383; see also 
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Rosa v. Resolution Trust Corp., 938 F.2d 383, 391 (3d Cir. 
1991).   
 
The District Court determined that it had subject 
matter jurisdiction over the Tellados’ claim against OneWest 
without directly addressing whether the jurisdictional bar in 
section 1821(d)(13)(D) applied.4
 
  OneWest argues that 
section 1821(d)(13)(D) precluded the District Court from 
exercising jurisdiction over this claim because the claim is 
predicated upon an act or omission of IndyMac, specifically 
IndyMac’s failure at closing to provide notice in Spanish of 
the right to cancel, and because the Tellados failed to exhaust 
their administrative remedies under FIRREA.   
We agree.  Under section 1821(d)(13)(D)(ii), courts do 
not have jurisdiction over a “claim relating to any act or 
omission of such institution or the [FDIC] as receiver.” 12 
U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D)(ii).  We have interpreted “such 
institution” in section 1821(d)(13)(D)(ii) to refer back to the 
“depository institution for which the [FDIC] has been 
appointed receiver” which is identified in section 
1821(d)(13)(D)(i).  Rosa, 938 F.2d at 392.  Here, the 
Tellados’ claim against the purchasing bank, OneWest, 
relates to an omission of the depository institution, IndyMac.  
We have not previously addressed whether FIRREA’s 
jurisdictional bar applies to claims against a purchasing bank 
based on the conduct of the depository institution or receiver, 
but several other circuits have concluded that it does apply. 
See Benson, 673 F.3d at 1214; Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 
642 F.3d 1137, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Vill. of Oakwood v. 
State Bank & Trust Co., 539 F.3d 373, 386-87 (6th Cir. 
2008).   
 
In Benson, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
determined that claims brought against a purchasing bank, 
based on the failed bank’s alleged malfeasance in connection 
with a Ponzi scheme, were jurisdictionally barred under 
section 1821(d)(13)(D) because “[t]he bulk of plaintiffs’ 
                                              
4 The District Court made an oral ruling from the bench that it 
did have jurisdiction and, on November 30, 2010, denied as 
moot OneWest’s motion to dismiss for a lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.  
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claims plainly qualify as ‘functionally, albeit not formally’ 
against a failed bank.” 673 F.3d at 1215 (citing Am. Nat’l Ins. 
Co., 642 F.3d at 1144 (“Where a claim is functionally, albeit 
not formally, against a depository institution for which the 
FDIC is receiver, it is a ‘claim’ within the meaning of 
FIRREA’s administrative claims process.”)).  The court 
further noted that “[c]laims of independent misconduct by an 
institution that purchases a failed bank are not covered by 
FIRREA’s exhaustion requirement” but found that the 
plaintiffs had not adequately pled a claim based on the 
assuming bank’s independent, post-purchase conduct. Id. at 
1215-17. 
 
As in Benson, the Tellados’ claim is functionally, 
albeit not formally, against IndyMac.  The Tellados 
characterize their claim as a claim against OneWest for its 
own misconduct, pointing to OneWest’s failure to cancel the 
loan in response to the Tellados’ August 2009 notice of 
cancellation.  However, as the District Court correctly held, 
the Tellados’ notice of cancellation was valid only because 
IndyMac had failed to provide proper notice of the right to 
cancel and as a result the cancellation period had not begun to 
run.  Without IndyMac’s wrongdoing, the Tellados would 
have no right to cancel and therefore no claim.  Thus, the 
Tellados’ claim is not a claim of independent misconduct by 
OneWest; rather, it relates to an act or omission of the 
depository institution, IndyMac, and is, therefore, 
jurisdictionally barred under section 1821(d)(13)(D)(ii). 
 
The Tellados contend, however, that their claim is 
based on OneWest’s failure to honor their August 2009 
cancellation demand.  Thus, they claim, it is not susceptible 
of resolution through FIRREA’s administrative process and is 
not a claim within the meaning of section 1821(d)(13)(D)(ii).  
The Tellados attempt to bolster this argument with the fact 
that the deadline to present an administrative claim under 
FIRREA could have expired as early as October 2008, before 
their August 2009 cancellation demand.   
 
However, as already established, their claim is wholly 
dependent upon IndyMac’s wrongdoing.  In Village of 
Oakwood, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that 
claims asserted against the assuming bank but “directly 
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related to acts or omission of the FDIC as receiver of 
Oakwood” were jurisdictionally barred, reasoned that 
“permit[ting] claimants to avoid [the] provisions of (d)(6) and 
(d)(13) by bringing claims against the assuming bank . . .  
would encourage the very litigation that FIRREA aimed to 
avoid.” 539 F.3d at 386 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals similarly cautioned in 
American National Insurance Company that “plaintiffs 
cannot circumvent FIRREA’s jurisdictional bar by drafting 
their complaint strategically.” 642 F.3d at 1144.  The fact that 
the deadline for bringing a claim through the administrative 
process may have passed does not convert the Tellados’ claim 
into a claim “not susceptible of resolution through the claims 
procedure.”  Because the Tellados’ claim is functionally 
against IndyMac, it is a claim within the meaning of 
FIRREA’s administrative process.  The Tellados cannot 
bypass the requirements of FIRREA by bringing the claim 
against OneWest.    
 
For these reasons, the entirety of the Tellados’ claim is 
jurisdictionally barred under section 1821(d)(13)(D), and the 
District Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over it.5
 
 
 B. Penalty Order 
 
  1. Jurisdiction 
 
 Because we find the District Court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction over the underlying matter, we must now 
determine whether the District Court also lacked jurisdiction 
to impose the $10,000 penalty against OneWest for failing to 
comply with the order to produce its CEO at trial.  “A final 
determination of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction of a case 
in a federal court . . . does not automatically wipe out all 
proceedings had in the district court at a time when the 
district court operated under the misapprehension that it had 
                                              
5 Because we find section 1821(d)(13)(D) bars jurisdiction 
here, we will not go on to determine if the MPA preempts 
Pennsylvania law or if the Home Owners’ Loan Act and its 
implementing regulations, 12 C.F.R. §§ 560.2(a) and (b), 
preempt the Tellados’ claim. 
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jurisdiction.” Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 137 
(1992); see also In re Orthopedic “Bone Screw” Prod. Liab. 
Litig., 132 F.3d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[D]espite the 
inability of a court to decide the merits of a case over which it 
lacks jurisdiction, a court does have the inherent authority 
both over its docket and over the persons appearing before 
it.”).   
 
Sanctions have been upheld in the absence of subject 
matter jurisdiction when the sanctions order is collateral to 
the merits. See Willy, 503 U.S. at 138 (upholding Rule 11 
sanctions in a case in which the district court was later found 
to lack subject matter jurisdiction because the sanctions order 
did not “raise the issue of a district court adjudicating the 
merits of a ‘case or controversy’ over which it lacks 
jurisdiction”);  In re Orthopedic “Bone Screw” Prod. Liab. 
Litig., 132 F.3d at 157 (vacating a sanctions order dismissing 
the case with prejudice when the district court was later 
determined to lack subject matter jurisdiction because the 
dismissal with prejudice had “the effect of adjudicating the 
merits of the case” but upholding a $500 monetary sanction 
against a litigant for failure to appear at a hearing).  However, 
a civil contempt order would fall in the absence of subject 
matter jurisdiction. See U.S. Catholic Conference v. Abortion 
Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 80 (1988) (holding 
that a civil contempt order for refusal to comply with a 
subpoena would fall if the district court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction).  In Willy, the Supreme Court distinguished 
between a civil contempt order and a Rule 11 sanction, noting 
that “[c]ivil contempt is designed to force the contemnor to 
comply with an order of the court” whereas “Rule 11 is 
designed to punish a party who has already violated the 
court’s rules.”  Willy, 503 U.S. at 139.  On that basis, the 
Court reasoned that a civil contempt order “should fall with a 
showing that the court was without authority to enter the 
decree,” but a Rule 11 sanction, grounded in “[t]he interest in 
having the rules of procedure obeyed,” should not.  Id.    
 
Here, the penalty order for defying the District Court’s 
order requiring the presence of OneWest’s CEO at trial is 
collateral to the merits of the underlying action.  Additionally, 
although issued under Rule 16(f)(1)(C), the penalty order is 
analogous to the Rule 11 sanctions in Willy because it was 
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designed to punish OneWest for its past violation of the order 
requiring the CEO’s presence at trial. See Olcott v. Delaware 
Flood Co., 76 F.3d 1538, 1553 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding 
sanctions pursuant to Rules 16(f) and 37(b) analogous to Rule 
11 sanctions in Willy and thus enforceable in the absence of 
subject matter jurisdiction).  Issued after the conclusion of the 
trial, the penalty order could not effectively coerce 
compliance with an order requiring the CEO’s presence at 
trial and thus is unlike a civil contempt order. 
 
For these reasons, we find that the penalty order does 
not fall away based on the District Court’s lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction over the underlying matter. 
 
 2. Due Process 
 
OneWest challenges the penalty order on several other 
grounds.  We address OneWest’s argument that the penalty 
order violates due process.   
 
We review sanctions orders for abuses of discretion, 
but “when the procedure the district court uses in imposing 
sanctions raises due process issues of fair notice and the right 
to be heard . . ., our review is plenary.” Martin v. Brown, 63 
F.3d 1252, 1262 (3d Cir. 1995).  “A finding of contempt, 
even under the auspices of Rule 16, must satisfy due process 
requirements.  . . .  Due process requires that a potential 
contemnor be given notice and a hearing regardless of 
whether the contempt is civil or criminal in nature.” Newton 
v. A.C. & S., Inc., 918 F.2d 1121, 1127 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(internal citations omitted).  In Newton, we held that “a court 
may not find a party or counsel in civil contempt for settling a 
case after a deadline fixed by the court without affording 
them their due process rights of adequate notice and a prior 
hearing.” Id. at 1129.  
  
Here, the District Court imposed the $10,000 penalty 
without providing the parties notice or a hearing on the issue.  
The District Court heard argument regarding OneWest’s 
failure to comply with the order requiring the CEO’s presence 
at trial but did not issue the penalty order at that time or give 
notice of a possible penalty then or at any time prior to 
issuing the order.  Nor was there a separate hearing on the 
12 
 
issue of the penalty.  Accordingly, the District Court violated 
due process requirements by not giving OneWest notice or 
the opportunity to be heard. 
 
We conclude that the penalty must be reversed on this 
basis.  Normally, we would vacate the order and remand the 
case to the District Court for further consideration of the 
penalty.  However, we see nothing in the facts of this case 
that would justify a penalty. Therefore, the penalty order 
cannot stand. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s Order of August 8, 2011, and the penalty order.   
